Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
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The purpose of the SBSS program of the United States is to maintain both nuclear warheads and weapons designers indefinitely. Further, it would actually increase the capabilities of the DOE in conducting above-ground experiments which could be used in designing new warheads. This could have serious repercussions for nuclear non-proliferation. At issue are (i) durability and viability of the Comprehensive Test Ban as an instrument for nuclear non-proliferation and (ii) nuclear disarmament and the adherence of the nuclear weapons states to the spirit of Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article VI calls for "good faith" negotiations towards disarmament. It states:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
The preamble of the NPT also calls for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to end all nuclear testing. The United States, along with other signatories of the NPT, made a commitment at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May, 1995 to sign a CTB by the end of 1996. This commitment was made in order to facilitate the indefinite extension of the NPT.
A CTB has historically had three purposes. The first was to help stop the spread of nuclear weapons by making it difficult for non-nuclear weapons states to develop nuclear weapons. This seems to be the view the Administration has taken in negotiating a CTB.(1) The second purpose of the CTB has been to halt vertical proliferation -- that is, to stop increases in the numbers, sophistication, and types of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states. The arrest of vertical proliferation has generally been regarded as an essential step towards ending the arms race and towards nuclear disarmament. This is the view taken by most signatories to the NPT. It is also a strongly held position by India, which is a de facto nuclear weapons state and not an NPT signatory, but which has historically been among the foremost governmental advocates of a CTB.(2) A third purpose has been to stop further radioactive contamination due to nuclear testing. Groundwater contamination or surface contamination from leaks at underground test sites is a significant concern.(3)
These objectives of "good faith" negotiations towards disarmament and a halt to weapons development have to be compared to the purpose and scope of the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program.
The SBSS program is designed to help the United States maintain an arsenal of nuclear weapons indefinitely. The importance of nuclear weapons to U.S. strategy has been repeatedly stated, including in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS which states that "nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future."(4) In recent testimony before Congress, C. Bruce Tartar, Director of Livermore, stated that a program was underway to extend the life of a particular warhead "so that it may remain part of the enduring stockpile beyond the year 2025 and will meet anticipated future requirements for the system."(5) Elsewhere, in the same testimony, Tarter states that "the laboratories and plants are developing comprehensive life-extension plans for each weapons system slated for the enduring stockpile."(6)
A large SBSS program could also create friction between the Western nuclear weapon states and Russia or China. Both Russia and China lack the funds to greatly expand their nuclear design infrastructure. Their inability to compete with the Western powers in above-ground experimentation could lead them to resist progress toward disarmament and may provide an incentive to test in order to make up for their lack of advanced facilities. For instance, Chinese insistence on a provision for "peaceful nuclear explosions" in a CTB could be a part of the government's strategy to maintain design capability in the face of the U.S. high-tech SBSS program. This would create uncertainty and instability in the international system and make the fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT even more difficult.
Another possible reaction by Russia, and possibly even China, to the SBSS program would be to participate in a form of cooperative stewardship. The United States, United Kingdom, and France already have a history of cooperation on their nuclear weapons programs. A recent official workshop held at Los Alamos on "cooperative stewardship" discussed the advantages of the five nuclear weapons states working together whenever possible. One of the possible advantages, according to a viewgraph from the workshop would be "[a]ssurance among the non-nuclear states that P5 [the nuclear weapons states] will act (usually in concert) to manage the nuclear regime."(7) While such cooperation could have its advantages in the context of implementation of Article VI of the NPT, cooperation to indefinitely maintain their nuclear arsenal is unlikely to be viewed in a kindly light by many non-nuclear states and by non-signatories to the NPT, notably Israel, India, and Pakistan. These last three countries are unlikely to accede to the NPT or abandon their own nuclear weapons programs under such circumstances.
The situation with SBSS and the CTB is somewhat comparable to another crisis surrounding two other treaties - the ABM treaty and START II. There are many powerful advocates in the U.S. for a partial or total abandonment of the ABM Treaty and for the deployment of a missile defense system, popularly called "Star Wars." But Russia lacks the money to develop such a system, much less to deploy it. Many in Russia view the Star Wars program as being a strategic threat because such a system, were it to become operational, could allow the United States to launch a first strike against Russia while being able to defend itself against a retaliatory attack. Therefore, Russia has linked the ratification of the START II arms reduction treaty by Russia to U.S. adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In such a situation, the stated motives of the United States, to counter putative missile threats from countries such as North Korea and Iran, are not nearly as important as the potential technical capability of the "Star Wars" system. It was precisely on this point that that President Gorbachev rejected President Reagan's proposal for nuclear disarmament during their Reykjavik summit in 1985.
An SBSS program with a strong nuclear weapons design element already exists in the United States. Proposed new facilities, such as DARHT and NIF, would considerably strengthen these capabilities. It is unlikely that these facilities could by themselves be used to design radically new weapons to the point that the Pentagon would accept them into the arsenal as functional and reliable. However, as we have noted, the current denial that new weapons are being designed is ambiguous, and does not rule out design of components or the creation of new weapons concepts. SBSS facilities could enable most of the design to be carried out. At that point certification could come rapidly after one or a few full-scale tests. Equally important, SBSS facilities can be used to make militarily significant modifications to existing designs. Thus, the SBSS program gives the United States a system that places it far ahead of potential adversaries, should it decide to withdraw from the CTB. This strategic advantage is magnified when viewed in conjunction with the potential abandonment of the ABM treaty and possible development and deployment of a "Star Wars" system.
The combination of the SBSS program with the U.S. conditions for involvement in a CTB is particularly troublesome. Among these conditions are: (8)
Pork-barrel pressures to maintain these design teams could, in a crisis, intensify. This could lead to a withdrawal from the CTB in order to test nearly-ready new designs to give the U.S. real or imagined advantages in brewing conflicts. Given this potential, other nuclear powers are more likely to maintain design capabilities that would give them parity or an advantage if the CTB broke down.
The determination of the weapons laboratories to maintain nuclear arsenals and weapons design laboratories is epitomized by the statement of Sandia National Laboratory's director, C. Paul Robinson, quoted above. Instead of linking a CTB to the creation of a road to nuclear disarmament, he looks forward to the replacement of "systems" in the existing stockpile "in the first half of the next century." He views the CTB and the halt in new weapons production only as a "hiatus" that could be several decades long. In this view new warheads will eventually be designed and built. And he anticipates that Russia will do the same. Such an attitude clearly contravenes the "good faith" requirement in the NPT of progress towards disarmament and lays the foundation for a dangerous and long-term gulf between the nuclear haves and have-nots.
The SBSS program, as part of the U.S. envisaged CTB regime, could create instabilities whose consequences for war and peace have not been explored, much less been vigorously debated. Even the effects of the SBSS program on the stability of deterrence (in the sense of retaliation against nuclear attack) have not been properly explored in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS. This is further complicated by the fact that documents such as the DARHT EIS state that the SBSS program is being used to determine whether or not the United States can even comply with a CTB. According to this argument, the SBSS program is necessary in order to determine whether the nuclear deterrent can be maintained under a CTB.(10) If the laboratories determine that SBSS is insufficient to maintain the nuclear arsenal, this could lead the United States to withdraw from the CTB.
Another potential danger of the SBSS program relates to the possibility that it might, rightly or wrongly, lead to a situation in which extensive component changes are deemed necessary for reliability reasons. Such changes could potentially cast doubt on warhead safety to a sufficient extent to create pressures for a withdrawal from the CTB treaty. Moreover, giving the weapons laboratories the power to determine when the U.S. stockpile might be in need of full-scale testing creates an inherent and intense conflict of interest.
We have shown that it is not at all clear from the DOE's own data that an SBSS program is needed for retaliatory nuclear deterrence. So far as the data available to us indicate, an extremely high level of reliability (as currently defined) appears only to be necessary for a first strike strategy. The first use of nuclear weapons inherent in this approach is contrary to the spirit of the NPT and could intensify proliferation pressures. In our view, it also increases the chances for nuclear conflict.
Even supporters admit the SBSS program could be seen by some countries as an attempt by the United States to circumvent the spirit and purpose of the CTB and NPT: to end the development of new nuclear weapons. One report stated that "one worrisome aspect of the SBSS program is that it may be perceived by other nations as part of an attempt by the U.S. to continue the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons."(11)
In sum, the SBSS program and the conditions for U.S. participation in a CTB, coupled with the stated U.S. goal of maintaining a large nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future, could seriously undermine the NPT. Keeping the Nevada Test Site open, holding on to a huge nuclear arsenal through lifetime extension programs and to nuclear weapons design teams for an indefinite period, and building new facilities under the rubric of the SBSS program are likely to be perceived as a violation of the spirit of Article VI of the NPT which requires signatories to negotiate in "good faith" on nuclear disarmament.
The negative impact of the SBSS on the CTB and NPT should be viewed in the context of the escalating pressures to deploy missile defenses and ever present tendencies toward pork-barrel spending for military purposes. Together, these factors could contribute to or result in new and dangerous nuclear instabilities in the post-Cold War World.
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org
Takoma Park, Maryland, USA
August, 1996
1 DOE 1995b, pp. 2-18 - 2-19
2 UN 1995 p. 63. This is part of a letter from Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement consisting of over 100 U.N. member states. India recently made the link at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva negotiating the CTB. "India Counters U.S. Position, Calls for A-Arms Eradication," Washington Post, Jan. 26, A30.
3 IPPNW and IEER 1991.
4 See Zerriffi 1996 for a discussion of nuclear strategy.
5 Tarter 1996, p. 11
6 Tarter 1996, p. 7
7 Viewgraph from a seminar called "Strategic Relationships Among the Nuclear Weapons Infrastructures" held at Los Alamos National Laboratory, April 3-4 1996.
8 White House 1995
9 Maintaining the Nevada Test Site indefinitely not only leaves open the possibility of renewed testing, it also ignores the claims of the Western Shoshone Native Americans to the land.
10 DOE 1995b, p. 2-9
11 JASON 1994, p. 19