Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
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Intense diplomacy since 1990 over the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has put the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) at the forefront of the global nuclear agenda. It has been the hope of the non-nuclear states that a CTB would be a step towards a de-escalation of the nuclear arms race. It was thought that it would prevent design of new warheads and hence end the qualitative aspects of the arms race. Yet that is not how things have been shaping up since May 1995, when the nuclear powers achieved their main goal of an indefinite extension of the NPT. China began testing almost immediately after the indefinite extension; France followed suit. The United States, in positive contrast, continued its testing moratorium, and announced support for a "zero yield" CTB, under which no nuclear explosions would be allowed. However it has attached conditions to a CTB that, if adopted, could cause new and dangerous international instabilities. As it stands, the CTB has been mired in disagreement.
Among other things, U.S. advocacy of a "zero yield" CTB is tied to the start-up of a major new program called the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program. This program would allow the U.S. to retain a large number of nuclear warhead designers for an indefinite period. Many official statements have also made it clear that the SBSS program is being conducted in the context of a U.S. decision to continue to hold onto a large nuclear arsenal for an indefinite period of time.(1)
The SBSS program is being promoted as essential to the maintenance of the U.S. stockpile because it would promote "safety and reliability" of the existing stockpile. The U.S. government states that it is not now designing new nuclear warheads. This report is an examination of the relationship of the SBSS program to safety, reliability, and warhead design capability. We have also attempted to analyze the relative importance of these factors in DOE's pursuit of the program, and concluded that maintaining design teams and capabilities are central to it. Whether a program to create such design capabilities is warranted depends on one's view of the commitments of the U.S. and nuclear weapons states under Article VI of the NPT, under which the nuclear weapons powers are obligated to pursue negotiations in "good faith" for complete nuclear disarmament. The NPT is law of all countries which have ratified it, including the United States.
We believe that so long as nuclear arsenals exist, safeguarding against accidental detonations of nuclear warheads is an issue of common concern that must be addressed, independent of one's positions on nuclear disarmament. But the Department of Energy's own data indicate that nuclear safety is not the main issue justifying the extensive new facilities. Other issues, such as reliability of arsenals for possible use in nuclear war and increasing the capability for new warhead design using laboratory facilities seem to be more at the heart of the SBSS program. Nuclear safety is a smokescreen behind which a permanent nuclear design establishment is to be maintained.
In this report we also explore the implications of U.S. nuclear strategy as it may relate to the SBSS program. Such a discussion is not an endorsement of any particular strategy. Our position is that all nuclear weapons states must make advances towards fulfilling their nuclear disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT. This is necessary both for progress towards the goal of ridding the world of existing weapons of mass destruction and preventing further proliferation problems from developing.
While this report examines the U.S. program for maintaining design capabilities, we note that other nuclear powers also appear to be following a similar course. For example, the Chinese government's insistence on maintaining the right to conduct "peaceful nuclear explosions" may be nothing but its own smokescreen for new nuclear weapon designs. France is building facilities similar to those of the U.S. Russia continues to operate weapons labs.
A full and extensive public debate on the dangers ahead of a CTB riddled with potential for failure is urgently needed. This report is intended as a contribution to that discussion.
We would like to thank Jackie Cabasso, Jay Coghlan, Dr. Marion Fulk, Marylia Kelley, Dr. Ray Kidder, Andy Lichterman, Greg Mello, and Dr. Ted Taylor for their review of a draft of this report. Of course, the authors are solely responsible for the content of the report, any omissions, and any errors that remain. We would also like to thank IEER staff members Lois Chalmers, Diana Kohn, Pat Ortmeyer, and Betsy Thurlow-Shields for their comments and assistance.
This paper is a part of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research's project to provide technical support to grassroots groups on nuclear weapons issues. We are grateful for the generous support of the Public Welfare Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program at Shelter Rock, the John Merck Fund, the Rockefeller Financial Services, Town Creek Foundation, Beldon Fund, and Stewart R. Mott Charitable Trust. The salary of Hisham Zerriffi while working at IEER from July 15, 1995 to January 15, 1996 was provided by the Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellowship.
Hisham Zerriffi
Arjun Makhijani
Takoma Park, Maryland
May 1996
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org
Takoma Park, Maryland, USA
August, 1996
1 Other recent decisions, such as the one to pursue tritium production for warhead maintenance, also make this clear. See Zerriffi 1996.